Blackstone Secured Lending Co-CEO Steps Down.

July 25, 2026

NEWS

On July 20, 2026, Jonathan Bock resigned from his role as Blackstone Secured Lending Fund’s (the “Fund”) Co-Chief Executive Officer.

His departure was not the result of any disagreement relating to Blackstone or the Fund’s operations, policies or practices.

During his tenure, Mr. Bock made valuable contributions to the Blackstone Credit & Insurance (“BXCI”) perpetual credit funds platform, including the Fund. BXCI thanks Mr. Bock for his dedicated service and wishes him continued success in his future endeavors.- 8-K Filing

DISCUSSION

Long Line

Yet another senior executive at an asset manager that sponsors BDCs has left his post.

As with the departures of Phil Tseng and Rajneesh Vig from BlackRock and BlackRock TCP (TCPC); Alex Chi from Goldman and Goldman Sachs BDC (GSBD) and Eric LLoyd at Barings and Barings BDC(BBDC), we are reassured in the official filings that these departures were "not due to any disagreement" about "operations, policies or practices".

Like The Kremlin Of Old

However, all the public BDCs involved have performed badly of late so it's hard to believe that none of these experienced senior managers were pushed.

The Street, though, keeps its secrets to itself, so we don't know.

All we can say that we don't remember any period in the twenty plus years we've been covering the BDC sector with so many senior management changes.

Underlying Cause?

That shouldn't be a surprise given that - by our count - 29 BDCs have underperformed to varying degrees over the past 12 months (achieving NAVPS losses of -2% or more - see the BDC NAV Change Table) and only 3 BDCs are up in price over this period.

Outside of the GFC and a brief period at the beginning of Covid, this is the worst of times for almost every BDC price-wise as a reading of any of our BDC Common Stock Market Recap weekly articles will confirm.

OUR VIEW

In Our Humble Opinion

Unfortunately, notwithstanding an above-average number of changes in the C-suite, we've not seen much in the way of "outside of the box" strategic thinking coming from the troubled BDCs of late.

Some BDCs have offered temporary compensation concessions and almost everyone has pledged to buy back much more of their stock given the huge discounts to book available.

However, we can't recall any BDC manager admitting that they were on the wrong course and setting sail in a new direction where their investing strategy is concerned, or how they are compensated.

[We have suggested in the past that externally managed BDCs might be able to rescue their stock price and now-battered reputations by a "shock and awe" re-structuring on how they are paid - tying fees to overall results and doing away with incentive fees altogether].

Yes, But

Maybe the only exception is Prospect Capital (PSEC) which did abandon its heavy commitment to CLO equity after years of arguing it was the bee's knees and began selling off its real estate portfolio. PSEC wants to remake itself into a middle market LBO lender, joining the many others already trawling those waters.

However, we don't remember management ever admitting they were wrong, even though their NAVPS dropped by over a third in five years and (17%) in the last 12 months alone, and offering to have a frank dialogue with its analysts nd shareholders. In fact, some shouting at an analyst was involved!

Nor did PSEC offer any compensation concessions. It's fee structure remains that of a 1980's hedge fund: 2/20/20.

Consequentially, it's no great surprise that PSEC reached its all-time price low this last Friday at $2.11 a share.

At its height, PSEC reached $17.89.

Throughout a 19-year price descent, management has never conceded that they had misstepped or offered any apology to their shareholders.

Not Alone

That's pretty much what the shareholders of other underperforming BDCs have experienced: very little in the way of self-criticism from the external manager and not much in the way of new thinking going forward.

If you can't identify the weakness in your business model or in your execution the chances of future results being better than in the past are low.

We get the impression that the managers of most underperforming BDCs are awaiting a change in market conditions rather than proactively seeking new solutions.

Here, the weakness of the BDC model with its absence of real "independent directors" who might otherwise shake things up is becoming very evident.

End Result

The danger is that many BDCs inexorably reach the stage of Investcorp Credit Management (ICMB), whose performance declined so much over the years that its only way out is to be sold for parts. Even that might be difficult because months have passed since Houlihan Lokey was called in to find one or more buyers.

We don't want to be alarmist, but when we look down the list of the 45 public BDCs we track, we count 22 candidates that could eventually follow in the footsteps of ICMB over the next 5 years if they don't change their ways.

Buying back shares and waiving a portion of incentive fees won't save them, or their shareholders, if their strategic approach remains flawed.

There are already 14 BDCs trading beneath $7 a share, and the sector has enjoyed a robust economy for years.

Imagine what might happen to the weaker players if we get a bog standard recession...

Pep Talk From The BDC Reporter

All of this to say that troubled BDCs need to step up and admit they have a problem and find new approaches to serving middle market borrowers.

Playing musical chairs with their senior managers - if that's what's happening with Jon Bock and the rest - won't be enough.

It's past time for a re-think for the public BDC sector and the failure to do so might result in catastrophic casualties.